**John Maynard Keynes Narrates the Great Depression:**

**His Reports to the Philips Electronics Firm**

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**Abstract:** In October 1929, the Dutch electronics firm Philips approached Keynes to write regular confidential reports on the state of the British and world economies, which he did from January 1930 to November 1934, at first monthly and then quarterly. These substantial reports (Keynes’s November 1931 report was twelve typed pages) show Keynes narrating the Great Depression in real time, as the world went through the US slowdown after the Wall Street crash, the Credit-Anstalt collapse in Austria, the German banking crisis in the summer of 1931, Britain’s departure from the gold exchange standard in August and September 1931, the US banking crisis leading to the Bank Holiday of March 1933, the London Economic Conference of 1933, and the coming of the New Deal. This series of reports has not been discussed in the literature, though the reports and surrounding correspondence are in the Chadwyck-Healey microfilm edition of the Keynes Papers. This paper examines Keynes’s account of the unfolding events of the early 1930s, his insistence that the crisis would be more severe and long-lasting than most observers predicted, and his changing position on whether monetary policy would be sufficient to promote recovery, and relates his reading of contemporary events to his theoretical development.

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**Introduction**

On October 23, 1929, just as Wall Street began to crash[[1]](#footnote-1) and the world economy moved into exceptionally interesting times, Dr. H. F. van Walsem, counsel and secretary to the Dutch electronics firm N. V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken[[2]](#footnote-2), wrote to “J. M. Keynes, Esq., C.B. Cambridge” asking him to write a monthly letter to the firm’s Economic Intelligence Service about the state of the British economy and the world economy. John Maynard Keynes’s letters to Philips, monthly from January 1930 to November 1931 and then, because of budget cuts to Philips’s Economic Intelligence Service, quarterly from February 1932 to November 1934, show Keynes narrating the events of the Great Depression as they occurred, and reveal his perception of the convulsions of the world economy as he wrote his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936). This substantial body of Keynes’s commentary on economic fluctuations (the November 1931 letter alone is twelve typed, double-spaced pages) has hitherto been neglected in the literature on Keynes. Keynes’s reports and the associated correspondence, preserved in the Keynes Papers at King’s College, Cambridge, are included in the 1993 Chadwyck-Healey microfilm edition of the Keynes Papers (section BM/5 Memoranda Exchanged with Business Houses), but the expense of this edition (which was sold only as a complete set of 170 reels of microfilm, priced at £9,700 or $17,000, plus $175 for a hardcover catalogue, Cox 1993) meant that only a few copies were sold. According to the WorldCat catalogue, there are five sets in libraries in the United States (Library of Congress, Harvard, Yale, Ohio State, and University of Texas at El Paso), two in Great Britain (Universities of Oxford and Sheffield), one in Canada (Victoria University in the University of Toronto) and a few in Germany (Göttingen), Italy and elsewhere but surprisingly little use has been made even of these copies of Keynes’s letters to N. V. Philips. Neither Moggridge (1992) nor Skidelsky (1983-2000, 2003), major biographies of Keynes by the authors who know the Keynes Papers best, mentions Keynes’s reports to Philips (but Backhouse and Bateman 2011, p. 129, have a paragraph about Keynes’s July 1930 report). As Jacqueline Cox (1995, p. 171) notes, the thirty volumes of Keynes’s *Collected Writings* (1971-89) include “only a third of the bulk classified as economic” in the Keynes Papers at King’s and do not include Keynes’s philosophical papers there, while “the personal papers were barely touched.” Donald Moggridge (2006, pp. 136-37) observes that “There has, inevitably, been heavier use of the Keynes Papers in King’s College Cambridge, which have the advantage of being available elsewhere on microfilm, than, say, his papers in the National Archives or his correspondence with his publishers, the last of which reveals the risks of depending on the Cambridge collection alone.” A vast amount of research has been done about Keynes and his economics, yet not all the relevant material has been explored.

These reports reveal Keynes’s reading of what was happening in the British and world economies through the first four years of the Great Depression, and provide the empirical counterpart to the record of Keynes’s theoretical development in this period given by notes taken by students at Keynes’s lectures from 1932 to 1935 (Thomas Rymes 1987, 1989, Dimand 1988). After the success of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919), Keynes no longer needed to be paid for lecturing, and so gave a single series of eight lectures each year, on the subject of whatever book he was writing at the time, so his lectures from 1932 to 1935 are in effect annual drafts of the book that became *The General Theory*. These lectures at Cambridge and the reports to N. V. Philips on what was happening in the economy provide theoretical and empirical supplements to Keynes’s *Collected Writings* (1971-89), respectively, in following Keynes’s intellectual development in the Great Depression, from *A Treatise on Money* (1930) to *The General Theory* (1936). In Keynes’s workload, his reports to Philips from 1930 to 1934 took the place of the London and Cambridge Economics Service Special Memoranda on commodity markets that he wrote from 1923 to 1930 (Keynes [1923-30] 1983, pp. 267-647), which provided an empirical counterpart to his normal backwardation theory of futures contracts ([1923] 1983; 1930, Chapter 29).

Keynes had much to recommend him to Philips as an observer of the British and world economies. In addition to his standing as a respected academic monetary theorist (about to publish his *Treatise on Money*, 1930), he was renowned far beyond the confines of the economics profession for *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919), was chairman of the Liberal weekly *The Nation and Athenaeum* (and after it merged with a more Labour-oriented competitor, a director of *The New Statesman and Nation*), and was in touch with financial opinion in the City of London (as chairman of the board of directors of the National Mutual Life Assurance Society from 1921 to 1938 and of the Provincial Insurance Company from 1923 until his death in 1946). Having affronted the Treasury and Bank of England with the acerbity of his critique of the return to the gold exchange standard at the prewar parity (Keynes 1925), his opinions were again being sought in official circles: within two months of being approached by Phillips, Keynes was appointed to new bodies, the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry and the Economic Advisory Council. “As you said, I am becoming fashionable again,” wrote Keynes to his wife Lydia Lopokova on November 25, 1929, upon being named to the Macmillan Committee (Skidelsky 2003, p. 419).

Replying on October 31 to von Walsem’s letter inviting him to write a monthly letter to the firm’s Economic Intelligence Service, Keynes was “quite ready to discuss this proposal with one of your representatives” but wished to clarify “that there will be no question of the publication of the letters and that they will be purely for the information of your own people” – and that “it would not be practicable to me to undertake such work except in return for a somewhat substantial fee which might be higher than you would be willing to offer.” On November 4, von Walsem assured him that the letters would not be published and “There are only two persons who, though not in our service, are closely related to our firm, who also receive a copy of our Intelligence Service which they, however, are bound to consider as absolutely confidential.” He suggested £100 a year. On November 13, Keynes, having “considered your kind proposal in relation to the fees which I have received on previous occasions for somewhat analogous work,” offered to undertake the task for an initial six months, for £150 a year[[3]](#footnote-3). Although Van Walsem had initially asked for the suggestion of other authors if Keynes preferred not take on the task at the suggested £100 a year, and Keynes equally pointedly offered to suggest such alternative authors if Philips did not care to pay £150 a year, Van Walsem accepted Keynes’s terms for Philips on November 22: “We think it desirable that one of our gentlemen will see you in order to discuss some details in the first half of December next.”

In the event two representatives of Philips (Messrs. Sannes and du Pré) met with Keynes for a discussion summarized “for good order’s sake” by van Walsem on December 21, 1929 (by which time van Walsem had already received a December 18 note by Keynes on the Australian exchange position). He recorded agreement that Keynes’s monthly letter would treat “some important factor in the development of the British economic situation and give your opinion as to its effects on trade in general and on our business in particular. Also you will draw our attention to important events in the domains especially interesting us, in so far as these come to your knowledge … Whenever you think it necessary you will give us your views on the situation in different parts of the British Empire or eventually of other countries. If possible we shall suggest [to] you special points to be considered in your letters.” Von Walsem wrote again on June 21, 1930 to confirm “that the arrangement has given us full satisfaction so that we are willing to continue on the same terms” and enclosed a cheque for 75 pounds. The arrangement also satisfied Keynes; he wrote on January 1, 1931, that “I have enjoyed preparing the letters.” Keynes’s letters balanced opinions about trade in general with observations about matters affecting Philips more specifically. Thus on January 11, 1930, Keynes stated that “The Factory capacity for Radio Sets seems to have become quite appalling during 1929” before proceeding more generally “to take this opportunity of emphasizing the anxiety which is felt here about the Australian position … I think that Australia may have more difficulties with her balance of trade during the coming year than the Argentine.”[[4]](#footnote-4)

**The Slump of 1930: Investment, Debts and Deflation**

Keynes’s April 1930 letter suggested that, although a general improvement had not yet arrived, “there are a fair number of indications that we may be somewhere in the neighbourhood of the bottom point.” In particular, “the continuance of cheap money, and even more the expectation of such continuance, is bound to be effective in the situation in the course of a few months,” but the effect on employment would be slower than on business feeling and the Stock Exchange and “it would not be surprising to see British unemployment figures go on mounting even to the neighbourhood of 2,000,000 up to the end of this calendar year. … The effect of many rationalisation schemes now in train will be for some time to come to improve profits rather than employment.” With a large amount of Australian gold en route to the Bank of England, “there is less anxiety about the British exchange position than there has been for a very considerable time past” and Keynes expected the creation of the Bank for International Settlements to have a positive effect on confidence, a foreshadowing of his emphasis at Bretton Woods on the importance of designing appropriate international monetary institutions. Keynes doubted that the Federal Reserve Board would reverse its cheap money policy “until business and employment in the United States is a great deal better than it is now.” This emphasis on expectations would be characteristic of Keynes’s *General Theory* (although equally in line with Irving Fisher’s quantity theoretic concern with expected inflation), as is the measurement of the ease of monetary policy by the cheapness of money, that is, by low nominal interest rates. Because nominal interest rates (especially short-term rates such as the Treasury Bill rate) were very low in a period of deflation, the Federal Reserve Board continued to view monetary conditions as easy throughout what Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963) later termed the “Great Contraction” of the US money supply (during which the monetary base increased, but not by enough to offset the rise in currency/deposit and reserve/deposit ratios), despite Fisher drawing the attention of his former student, Federal Reserve Governor Eugene Meyer, to the statistics on the shrinkage of the money supply, the sum of currency and demand deposits (Cargill 1992).

On June 24, 1930, H. du Pré emphasized that, “In reply to your remarks about the character of your monthly letters, we assure you that we leave it entirely to you to judge in each case which are the topics which are most worth being discussed by you.” Nonetheless, “There is one question upon which we particularly should like to have your opinion.” Keynes’s monthly letters had repeatedly stated that recovery depended on the bond market becoming more active, with new loans being used not just for the refunding of floating debt but for new productive investment. “But on the other hand these last months many articles in the economic press” saw excessive capacity in many industries; “in other words that the world has first to grow into a productive apparatus which is too big for immediate needs. If this should be true, can a renewed investment-activity soon be hoped for, and if it soon comes, would it really do good? Of course there would be less unemployment in a number of industries; but would not prices of consumptive commodities, and so cost of living, rise? And especially it might turn out after some time, that the new activity has only added to the – supposed – actual over-investment, so that the disequilibrium would only be greater. It may of course be that entirely new industries are going to take the lead, but we do not yet see any that are very likely to do so. We should be much obliged if you would solve this puzzle for us or at least give your views on the pretended overcapacity and its probable effects on future developments in your next letter.” This letter sheds light on the audience for Keynes’s reports in the secretariat of N. V. Philips: not just salesmen looking for tips about the market for radio sets in Great Britain or elsewhere, but thoughtful businessmen pondering sophisticated economic issues such as the dual nature of productive investment in creating demand while increasing capacity (a problem to which the warranted growth rate of Harrod 1939 was an attempted solution).

In his July 1930 letter (seven typed pages, plus a six-page note on the bond market), Keynes warned that “it is now fully clear the world is in the middle of an international cyclical depression of unusual severity … a depression and a crisis of major dimensions … I believe that the prevailing opinion in the United States is still not pessimistic enough and is relying too much on a recovery in the early autumn, an event which is, in my opinion, most improbable. Nothing is more difficult than to predict the date of recovery. But all previous experience would show that a depression on this scale is not something from which the recovery comes suddenly or quickly.” He felt that “The optimism of Wall Street and the hoarding tendencies of France may prevent any real recovery of the International Loan Market this year” and considered whether this might lead to “a psychological atmosphere in which really drastic scientific measures will be taken by Great Britain and the United States in conjunction to do what is humanly possible to cause a turn of the tide next spring. But one is travelling here into the realm of the altogether uncertain and unpredictable.” In contrast, the Harvard Economic Society (founded by Harvard economics professors Charles J. Bullock and Warren Persons) stated in its weekly letter on June 28, 1930, that “irregular and conflicting movements of business should soon give way to sustained recovery” and on July 19 that “untoward elements have operated to delay recovery but the evidence nevertheless points to substantial improvement” (quoted by Galbraith 1961, p. 150, see also Walter Friedman 2014).

Responding to du Pré’s query, Keynes reiterated that recovery would be preceded by “a substantial fall in the long-period rate of interest … leading in due course to the recovery of investment.” But now he explained that he was not thinking of investment in manufacturing industry, “the world’s capacity for which is probably quite ample for the present.” Even at the highest estimate, the total cost of bringing Britain’s industrial plant up to date “would not use up the country’s savings for more than, say, three months. Moreover, when expected profits are satisfactory the rate of expenditure by manufacturing industry in fixed plant is not very sensitive to the rate of interest.”

“On the other hand,” in contrast to manufacturing, “the borrowing requirements for building, transport and public utilities are not only on a far greater scale, but are decidedly sensitive to the rate of interest. If I were to put my finger on the prime trouble to-day, I should call attention to the very high rate of interest for long-term borrowers … the long-term rate of interest is higher to-day than it has been in time of peace for a very long time past. When, at the same time, there is a big business depression and prices are falling, it is not surprising that new enterprise is kept back at the present level of interest.” He drew attention to “those who might be called distress borrowers, that is say countries which have an urgent need for borrowing to pay off existing debts, and are consequently ready to pay a very high rate of interest,” citing prospective Austrian, Hungarian and Australian loans on the London bond market, and remarked that “the effect of the German Loan has been to supply the French Treasury with funds, which it has withdrawn from the French market and is keeping unemployed in the Bank of France.” Keynes’s July 1930 letter (discussed briefly by Backhouse and Bateman 2011, p. 129) illuminates both his analysis of the present situation and the role of investment in his economics. His distinction between investment in manufacturing, responsive to expected profit rather than interest rates, and interest-sensitive investment in construction, transport and public utilities clarifies his theory of investment. Increased investment was crucial for recovery of the world economy, and low long-term interest rates were necessary for high levels of investment in construction, transport and public utilities, the largest part of investment (even if manufacturing investment depended more on expected profits). In regard to the current situation, Keynes explained the forces getting long-term interest rates high even when prices were falling and short-term interest rates were low, but felt that “progress has been made towards getting the necessitous borrowers out of the way.” On the immediate practical level, Keynes’s distinction between the determinants of the two categories of investment dealt with du Pré’s question of how low long-term interest rates could stimulate investment given excess productive capacity in manufacturing. And yet, unlike Harrod (1939), Keynes’s July 1930 letter did not come to grips with the theoretical point raised by du Pré, the dual character of investment in creating both demand and productive capacity.

Keynes’s August 1930 letter dissented from the view widely held in the United States “even in responsible quarters, that we may expect an autumn recovery with some confidence … a good deal of the American optimism is based on analogies drawn from the date of recovery after the 1920-21 slump” (compare the Harvard Economic Society’s statement on August 30 that “the present depression has about spent its force,” quoted by Galbraith 1961, p. 150). He argued that “Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the really catastrophic character of the price falls of some of the principal raw materials since a year ago” (even larger than appeared from published index numbers, because those included a number of commodities subject to price controls), which “must profoundly affect the purchasing power of all overseas markets.” Long-term interest rates remained high, reducing new capital investment. In contrast, Keynes considered general opinion about the British position to be “perhaps a little too pessimistic.” Britain was already in a difficult position before the slump of 1929 and 1930, because of the 1925 return to the gold exchange standard at the prewar parity (over the eloquent protests of Keynes 1925). But the heavy unemployment in the slump was limited to textiles and heavy industry (iron and steel, coal, and shipbuilding), export-based sectors already hit by the return to gold at an overvalued exchange rate (in his December 1930 letter, Keynes stated that if textiles, iron and steel, and coal were omitted, there was practically no decline in the Index of Production from a year before and an improvement from two years before). Keynes explained that British unemployment statistics, when used in international comparisons, “probably overstate the case” since the British statistics included “a great many workers in definite employment, but working short time … It is even the case that workers taking their normal summer holidays are now included in the figures of the unemployed.” According to *The Economist*, the aggregate profits of all British joint stock companies reporting their earnings in the first half of 1930 “were not only greater than in the previous year, but were larger than in any previous year. This was partly due to the prosperity of British Oil Companies operating abroad, but by no means wholly.” Nor did Keynes share the worries of financial opinion in London (and so some extent his own previous letter to Philips) about “the constant dribble of gold to France.”

In Keynes’s September 1930 letter to Philips, he was “still of the opinion that real recovery is a long way off. But at the same time it seems to me not unlikely that we are at, or near, the lowest point ... It is time, therefore, to cease to be a ‘bear’, even if it is not yet time to be a ‘bull’.” His February 1931 letter began, “Glancing through the letters of previous months, I find that they were all extremely pessimistic (with a brief lapse into modified optimism in September, corrected in October). Nevertheless, in the light of the actual course of events they were scarcely pessimistic enough. Nor do I see any reason for expecting any appreciable alleviation in the coming months.” His September 1930 letter reported that “An extraordinary example of the way in which a situation can suddenly turn round, when a tendency has been greatly overdone, has been seen on the London Stock Exchange in the last two weeks. There has been no recovery of business in Great Britain to account for it. The real facts are much as they were a month ago. But market pessimism, aided by bear operations, had brought security prices down to an absurdly low level not justified by the circumstances … everyone knew in his heart that prices were falling to foolish levels. The result was that within a few days the prices of many leading securities had risen from 10 to 20 per cent.” The stock market had diverged from any level that could be construed as reflecting underlying fundamentals, but then abruptly bounced back. Keynes again stressed that Britain was not doing as badly as the United States in the slump: the fall in the British index of production from the previous year “is certainly less than 10 per cent” whereas the US index of industrial production for July 1930 was 37% below that for July 1929.

Keynes’s 1930 “October Letter” warned that, “The catastrophic increase in the value of money has raised the burden of indebtedness of many countries beyond what they can bear … in many parts of the world the fall of prices has now reached a point where it is straining the social system at its foundations. Agriculturists and other producers of primary materials are being threatened with ruin and bankruptcy all over the world. It is useless to expect a recovery of markets in such conditions” (and in his February 1931 letter he again warned that “The prospect of a long series of defaults [by debtor countries exporting raw materials] during 1931 is not be excluded”). All of the gains that Germany had received in the Young Plan for reparations compared to the Dawes Plan were obliterated because “the clause in the Dawes Plan by which her [Germany’s] liabilities in terms of gold were to be modified in the event of a change in prices was not included in the Young Plan.” Keynes declared himself “rather more pessimistic … than a month ago.” He remarked that in Britain, “Very slight steps have been taken, as yet, in the direction of reducing wages, which is probably inevitable, but will not get anyone much further if all countries alike embark on wage-cutting policies.”

These themes of Keynes’s October 1930 letter to Philips, the danger of ruin and bankruptcy from price deflation in a world where debts are fixed in money terms and the futility of wage-cutting, appeared publically in his December article in *The Nation and Athenaeum* on “The Great Slump of 1930” (reprinted in his *Essays in Persuasion*, 1931). There Keynes (1931, pp. 138-139) warned that, since wage and price deflation increases the real burden of debt and wage cuts reduce purchasing power, “neither the restriction of output nor the reduction of wages serves in itself to restore equilibrium” and went on to emphasize that “Moreover, even if we were to succeed eventually in re-establishing output at the lower level of money-wages appropriate to (say) the pre-war level of prices, our troubles would not be at an end. For since 1914 an immense burden of bonded debt, both national and international, has been contracted, which is fixed in terms of money. Thus every fall of prices increases the value of the money in which it is fixed. For example, if we were to settle down to the pre-war level of prices, the British National Debt would be nearly 40% greater than it was in 1924 and double what it was in 1920; … the obligations of such debtor countries as those of South America and Australia would become insupportable without a reduction of their standard of life for the benefit of their creditors; agriculturalists and householders throughout the world, who have borrowed o mortgage, would find themselves the victims of their creditors. In such a situation it must be doubtful whether the necessary adjustments could be made in time to prevent a series of bankruptcies, defaults, and repudiations which would shake the capitalist order to its foundations” (see also Dimand 2011). Here, before Fisher (1932, 1933), was the concern with the effect of deflation on the real value of nominal deflation that reappeared in Chapter 19, “Changes in Money Wages,” of *The General Theory*, where Keynes (1936, p. 264) warned that “if the fall of wages and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those entrepreneurs who are heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency – with severely adverse effects on investment.”

**Contested Budgets, Trade Balance and the Banking and Exchange Crises of 1931**

In 1930, Keynes’s “November Letter” argued that foreign opinion underestimated the financial strength that accompanied Britain’s industrial weakness: “it is forgotten that the adverse tendencies of the foreign exchanges, until recently, have been due, not to the absence of a favourable foreign trade balance, but to the eagerness of British investors to take advantage of the high profits or high rates of interest obtainable abroad. In 1929 the British favourable balance available for new foreign investment was greater than that for any other country, greater even than that for the United States. The Bank of England’s difficulties were due to the fact that the pressure of savers to take advantage of opportunities abroad was even greater.” Subsequent events in Wall Street and elsewhere had made overseas investment less appealing to British savers, so that the Bank of England was holding twenty million pounds sterling more of gold than a year before. In his December 1930 letter, Keynes reported that, even though “The perpetual drain of gold to France provides a source of nervousness and irritation in the money market” and although thirty million pounds sterling of gold had moved from Britain to France in the previous three months, the Bank of England held twenty-two million pounds sterling more in gold than a year before (but Keynes’s March 1931 letter reported that a drain of twenty million pounds sterling of gold from the Bank of England in the previous three months “causing nervous talk to prevail in London”). Despite Keynes’s repeated insistence on the financial strength of sterling and the growing gold reserves of the Bank of England (less than a year before the crisis of August and September 1931 that forced Britain off the gold exchange standard), the underlying message was that capital mobility under fixed exchange rates would constrain even the Bank of England from trying to lower long-term interest rates to stimulate investment. Until Britain left the gold standard and allowed sterling to float, Keynes’s letters to Philips monitored the strength of protectionist sentiment in the British Government, but he lost interest in tariff proposals once the exchange rate was no longer pegged (see Keynes 1931). But there was one bright spot for Britain: Keynes’s February 1931 letter stressed that “It must not be overlooked that England is gaining enormously by the tremendous drop in the price of her imports as compared with that of her exports.”

Keynes’s April 1931 letter to Philips is notable for explaining that Britain’s apparent budget deficit of £23.5 million for the fiscal year ending March 31 “is not as bad as it sounds, since this figure is reached after allowing for the repayment of £67,000,000 of debt. So that, apart from debt repayments, there was a surplus on the year’s workings of £43,500,000. It must be doubtful whether any other country is showing so favourable a result. Even if the sum borrowed for the unemployment fund, which lies outside the budget[[5]](#footnote-5), were to be deducted, there would still have on the year a net reduction of debt.” The next year’s was expected to be larger, but “If no debt were to be repaid, there would probably be no deficit, even for the forthcoming year.” Keynes’s May 1931 letter, reporting on the budget presented by Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer Phillip Snowden, noted that “there will still be some reduction of debt during the forthcoming year, though not on as large as a scale as formerly.” A few months later, when Snowden and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald broke with their party to join the Conservatives in a National Government to deal with a budget and exchange crisis, Snowden found it convenient to overlook that the apparent budget deficit was an artefact of budgeting for a reduction in the national debt, and to denounce his former Labour Cabinet colleagues for endangering the savings of small depositors by having the Post Office Savings Bank lend to the Unemployment Insurance Fund, without mentioned that such loans were guaranteed by the Treasury or that he had neglected to inform his Cabinet colleagues of the borrowing (as Keynes indignantly explained in two paragraphs in the draft of his November 1931 letter, deleted from the final version).

Keynes’s May 1931 letter is also notable, in light of the subsequent exchange crisis that forced Britain off gold in September, for insisting that “The improvement in the sterling exchanges and the better gold position of the Bank of England, as it appears in the public returns, are not deceptive and may be assessed at even more than their face value.” He held that “When there is no longer serious pressure on the Bank of England’s gold, the stage will be set for really cheap money throughout the world … It will not mean a recovery, but it will pave the way for the recovery of investment which must precede the recovery of prices and profits.” Keynes again emphasized that “the fall in the prices of the commodities imported by Great Britain has been so much greater than the fall in the prices of her exports. On the visible trade balance Great Britain was £5,000,000 better off in the first quarter of 1931 than in either of the preceding years … Thus the main burden of the present crisis falls on the raw-material-producing countries, and Great Britain is likely to gain gold in spite of the immense decline of her exports.”

By the next month, as the Credit-Anstalt collapsed in Vienna (see Schubert 1991), as French and American capital then took flight from Germany (see Balderston 1994), and as share prices slumped in London, Wall Street and on most European bourses, Keynes felt “that we are now entering the crisis, or panic, phase of the slump. I am inclined to think that we look back on this particular slump we shall feel that this phase has been reached in the summer months of 1931, rather than at any earlier date.” He warned that “the consequences of a change in the value of money, as reflected in the prices of leading commodities, so violent as that which has occurred in the last eighteen months, cannot be regarded too gravely. Until prices show a material rise the whole fabric of economic society will be shaken. Each decline of commodity prices and each further collapse on the Stock Exchanges of the world brings a further group of individuals or institutions into a position where their assets doubtfully exceed their liabilities.”

**Looking Across the Atlantic: The American Slump**

Keynes’s July 1931 letter focused on the United States, where 21% of the industrial population was unemployed with perhaps another 20% working only two or three days a week: “it is quite out of the question that there should be anything which could be called a true recovery of trade at any time within, say, the next nine months. The necessary foundations for such a recover simply do not exist.” Many of the loans of small banks to farmers or secured by real estate “are non-liquid and probably impaired. Thus there is a strong desire for the utmost liquidity while obtainable on the part of the ordinary Bank; and general unwillingness to take any unnecessary risks or to embark on speculative enterprise, even where the risk may be actuarially a sound one. The nervousness on the part of the Bankers is accompanied by a nervousness of the part of their depositors … So there is quite a common tendency to withdraw money from the banks and keep resources hoarded in actual cash … It was estimated that in the country as a whole as much as $500,000,000 was hoarded in actual cash in this way” (see Fisher 1933, Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Bernanke 2000). Keynes stressed that, “The American financial structure is more able than the financial structure of the European countries to support the strain of so great a change in the value of money. The very great development of Bank deposit and of bondage indebtedness in the United States means that a money contract has been interposed between the real estate on the one hand and the ultimate owner of the wealth on the other. The depreciation in the money value of the real estate sufficient to cause margins to run off, necessarily tends therefore to threaten the solidity of the structure.”

Keynes reported in his July 1931 letter that although US agricultural wages had fallen by 20 to 25%, and there had also been large cuts to wages in small-scale industrial enterprises, hourly wages were practically unchanged for two thirds of the workers in large-scale industrial enterprises while the hourly wages of the other third had been reduced by some 10%. In October 1934, however, Keynes stated in his Cambridge lectures that “Labour will and has accepted reductions in money wages, in the USA in 1932, and it will not serve to reduce unemployment” with one student’s notes calling the money-wage reductions “catastrophic” (Rymes 1987, p. 131).

**Germany Defaults, Britain Abandons the Gold Parity**

Turning from the United States, Keynes remarked near the end of his July letter that, “At the moment of writing there are heavy gold drains from London; but I do not think that this need be regarded with any undue alarm,” a judgement that proved too sanguine. More presciently, he added “The real danger in the situation comes from the possibility of the declaration of a general moratorium in Germany and the collapse of the mark [Germany defaulted on July 15]. The repercussion of such events on the solvency of the banking and money market systems of the world would be most serious.” The next month, in his August 1931 newsletter (dated August 4), Keynes reported that “the bulk of the remaining short-term German debt is due to British and American banks and accepting houses; many accepting houses being landed with what are certainly frozen and may prove doubtful debts. Their own credit has suffered with the inevitable result, since they were the holders of large foreign balances, of a drain of gold from London … it would seem to be only ordinary prudence to act on the assumption that, while worse developments in Germany are doubtless possible, even apart from this the general underlying position is worse than the ordinary reader of newspapers believes it to be.” While “Great Britain is suffering from the temporary shock to confidence due to the difficulties of the accepting houses,”[[6]](#footnote-6) the situation of the world economy as a whole was more serious: “We are certainly standing in the midst of the greatest economic crisis of the modern world. Important though the German developments have been I would emphasize that these have been essentially consequences of deeper causes which are affecting all countries alike … For there is no financial structure which can withstand the strain of so violent a disturbance of values.” A handwritten postscript at the end of the typed August 1931 letter warns Keynes’s readers “not to be encouraged even by the appearance of apparently good news. The world financial structure is shaken and is rotten in many directions. Patching arrangements will be attempted, but they will not do much good, and it would be a mistake to place reliance on them.” The next day, August 5, Keynes, writing to Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald to urge rejection of the May Report, stated that “it is now virtually *certain* that we shall go off the existing parity at no distant date … when doubts, as to the prosperity of a currency, such as now exist about sterling, have come into existence, the game’s up” (Keynes 1971-89, Vol. XX, pp. 591-93; Skidelsky 2003, p. 446), but he did not say so in print or to Philips – and he rejected, on patriotic grounds, a suggestion by O. T. Falk that the Independent Investment Trust, of which Keynes and Falk were directors, should replace a dollar loan with a sterling loan, which Keynes condemned as “a frank bear speculation against sterling.” The Independent Investment Trust lost ₤40,000 by not switching its financing (Keynes 1971-89, Vol. XX, pp. 611-12; Moggridge 1992, pp. 528-29; Skidelsky 2003, p. 447).

It was not only the world financial structure that was shaken; so was the Secretary Department of N. V. Philips. On August 6, 1931, H. du Pré wrote plaintively to Keynes, “Though we could hardly expect otherwise from your former letters, we note that you are not at all optimistic about the developments in the latter part of this year. These last weeks we read in the papers some statements from several Americans (among them people of authority), which hold a somewhat more cheerful view for the coming months. Must we infer from your letter that they are still, or again, too optimistic or is it possible that since your return from America[[7]](#footnote-7) there have been some improvements, which may lead one to expect some improvement at least for the autumn?” Even Roger Babson, who had made his reputation by being bearish about the stock market in September 1929 (as he had been since 1926), was bullish by early 1931 (see W. Friedman 2014).

Keynes’s reply on August 12 crushed any hopes: “In response to your enquiry, nothing has happened to make me more optimistic. As regards America, I consider that recovery this autumn is altogether out of the question. But the minds of all of us are of course dominated by the European and indeed the world situation. This still seems to me to be, as I have already described it, more serious than the general public know. I should recommend as complete inaction as is possible until further crises, or further striking events of some kind or another have occurred to clear up the situation.”

Keynes’s September letter (dated September 10, 1931), after the Conservative-dominated National Government displaced Labour, warned that “the hysterical concentration on Budgeting economy, which has also spread to the curtailment of expenditure by Local Authorities is calculated to produce unfavourable developments. For the widespread curtailment of expenditure is certain to reduce business profits and increase unemployment and lower the receipts of the Treasury, whilst it will do very little to tackle what is the fundamental problem, namely the improvement of the British Trade Balance. We seem likely to be faced by a period during which the balance of trade will not be sufficient to give confidence to foreign depositors.”

It turned out, however, that one part of the cuts in government spending, the reduction in pay of the armed services, did indirectly dispose of the balance of payments problem. Since the government’s version of equal sacrifice was that a vice-admiral earning £5 10s a day would lose 10 shillings a day (a reduction of 1/11), while naval lieutenants earning £1 7s a day and able-bodied seamen earning 5 shillings a day should each lose a shilling a day, reductions of 1/27 and 1/5, respectively (Muggeridge 1940, p. 109n), a naval mutiny erupted at Invergordon on September 16 (the first British naval mutiny since 1797), leading to abandonment of a fixed exchange rate on September 21 and a prompt 20% depreciation of sterling. Once the gold parity was abandoned, interest rates could be lowered without any balance of payments crisis. Commander Stephen King-Hall remarked “the strange combination of circumstances which caused the Royal Navy to be used by a far-seeing Providence as the unconscious means of … releasing the nation from the onerous terms of the contract of 1925 when the pound was restored to gold at pre-war parity … In 1805 the Navy saved the nation at Trafalgar; it may be that at Invergordon it achieved a like feat” (quoted by Muggeridge 1940, p. 111n). As for the budget deficit, Chancellor Snowden, who in the preceding Labour government had steadfastly blocked any reduction in the Sinking Fund contributions for paying down the national debt, now presented a budget reducing the annual Sinking Fund contribution by £20 million. Keynes declared in his October 1931 letter to Philips, “Great Britain’s inevitable departure from the gold standard having occurred, it has been received with almost universal relief and in industrial circles a spirit of optimism is now abroad … Since the City and the Bank of England did their utmost to avoid the change, they feel that honour is satisfied. In other quarters the effect is to relieve a tension which was becoming almost unbearable … I have no doubt at all as to the reality of the stimulus which British business has obtained.” Fisher (1935), assembling data on twenty-nine countries, found that recovery began only once a country abandoned the gold parity and was able to pursue a looser monetary policy (see Dimand 2003).

Keynes concluded his October 1931 letter, “The general passion for liquidity is bringing the value of cash in terms of everything else to so high a level as to be very near breaking point. This does not apply to Great Britain since her crisis was a balance of payments crisis rather than a banking crisis strictly so called. Thus the possibility of a general European and American banking crisis is the main risk, the possibility of which has now to be borne in mind.” The US banking crisis culminated in the “Bank Holiday” of March 1933, while all the major German and Italian banks passed into government ownership.

On November 3, 1931, Dr. du Pré was “very sorry to say that the necessity for the strictest economy which makes itself felt in all departments of our concern at present, impels us to an important curtailment of the budget of our Economic Intelligence Service” which would now issue bulletins every three months, instead of monthly. He asked Keynes for quarterly letters for £50 per annum, instead of monthly letters for £150 per annum. Keynes replied on November 9 that he read the letter “without any great surprise. I had been rather hesitating in my mind as to whether it is worth while to continue the arrangement on the new basis. But on the whole I feel that I should not like to break the friendly relations which have arisen between us, merely because times are bad.” He accepted the offer[[8]](#footnote-8), asking to be reminded when each quarterly report was due, and enclosed his November letter stating that Britain was “to a considerable extent getting the best of both worlds since broadly speaking the countries from which we buy our food and raw materials have followed us off gold, whilst our manufacturing competitors have remained on the old gold parity.”[[9]](#footnote-9) He felt that Continental observers were mistaken to think that Britain would want to return to gold: “Foreigners always underestimate the slow infiltration of what I have sometimes called ‘inside opinion’, whilst ‘outside opinion’ remains ostensibly unchanged. Then quite suddenly what ‘inside opinion’ becomes ‘outside opinion’. Foreigners are quite taken by surprise, but the change is really one which had been long prepared. In the later months of the old gold standard there was a hardly a soul in this country who really believed in it. But it was considered that it was our duty for fairly obvious reasons to do everything we possibly could to keep where we were.”

Keynes’s May 1932 quarterly letter stressed that, “The most important development, if one is thinking not so much of the moment but of laying the foundations for future improvement, is to be found in the return to cheap money, which was interrupted by the financial crisis of last summer and the departure from gold. I am more and more convinced in the belief, which I have held for some time, that an ultra-cheap money phase in the principal financial centres is an indispensable preliminary to recovery … Nevertheless it would be imprudent to expect too much at any early date from the stimulus of cheap money. The courage of enterprise is now so completely broken, that the effect on prices of money however cheap will be very slow. I consider it likely, therefore, that the cheap money phase may be extremely prolonged and that it may proceed to unprecedented lengths before it produces its effect.” He concluded, “For the time being the world is marking time, – waiting for it does not quite know what. I emphasise again the fact that the position in Great Britain, and in some of her Dominions, is relatively good. But for the time being, I see no light anywhere else … It would certainly be much too soon to take any steps whatever to be ready for a possible revival.”

**Looking Across the Atlantic: Hope from the New Deal**

Keynes’s August 1932 memorandum was notable for its explanation of why US stock prices had risen sharply and why that need not signal an end to the industrial crisis: the financial crisis had driven down stock prices until “the securities of many famous and successful companies were standing at little more than the equivalent of the net cash and liquid resources owned by those companies … the assets in question would either be worth nothing as a result of the general breakdown of contract, or must, in any circumstances apart from that, be worth a very great deal more than their quotations. Consequently, it is logical and right that the fear of their being worth nothing having been brought to an end, there should be a rapid recovery of the quotations on a very striking scale. It does not need a termination of the industrial crisis, or even an expectation of its early cessation, in order to justify the new levels.”

In his February 1933 memorandum, commenting on the likely futility of the projected World Economic Conference, Keynes recalled that “I have myself put forward more drastic proposals for an international fiduciary currency, which would be the legal equivalent of gold. If this were agreed to, the position would be so much eased that various other desirable measures would also become practicable. I do not despair of converting British opinion to such a plan, but I am told that continental opinion would be almost unanimously opposed it.” Keynes had contemplated such proposals long before Bretton Woods.

Keynes’s August 1933 memorandum (actually mailed July 20, before Keynes left for holidays) held that “My own view is that President’s Roosevelt’s programme is to be taken most seriously as a means not only of American, but of world recovery. He will suffer set-backs and no one can predict the end of the story. But it does seem fairly safe to say that his drastic policies have had the result of turning the tide in the direction of better security not only in the United States, but elsewhere … Perhaps in the end President Roosevelt will devalue the dollar in terms of gold by 30 or 40 per cent.” His November 1933 memorandum regretted “the failure of the President during his first six months to act inflation as well as talk it. In actual fact Governmental loan expenditure in the United States up to the end of September was on quite a trifling scale” but since then it seemed to be increasing: “if during the next six months the President is at last successful in putting into circulation a large volume of loan expenditure, I should expect a correspondingly rapid improvement in the industrial prosperity of America. This, if it occurs, would have a great influence on the rest of the world and especially on Great Britain … it might pave the way for a rate of improvement sufficiently rapid to deserve the name of real recovery.” Keynes’s February 1934 memorandum reported that in the United States “everything is moving strongly upwards. This is to be largely attributed to the fact that Governmental loan expenditure is now at last occurring on a large scale … the disbursement by the American Treasury of new money against borrowing has reached or is approaching $50,000,000 weekly and should maintain this rate for a few months to come.” In his August 1934 memorandum, having visited the United States since his May memorandum, he found there “a recession which is somewhat more than seasonal,” aggravated since his visit by a “failure of the corn crop … so acute as to be little short of a national disaster” but the actual and prospective level of US Government loan-financed expenditure made him optimistic about prospects for the US economy in the autumn and winter. He also reported that “the view is generally held in Great Britain that the gold block countries – including Holland not less than the others – cannot permanently maintain their present parity with gold without a disaster. Now or later it seems to us certain that the necessity for devaluation will be admitted.” The reports end with Keynes’s November 1934 memorandum, with no correspondence in the Keynes Papers concerning the end of his relationship with the Philips firm.

**Conclusion: The Message of Keynes’s Reports to Philips**

Keynes’s letters to the Philips electronics firm reveal he perceived events in the British and world economies from the beginning of 1930 through November 1934, and provide pungent and insightful commentary. These reports high-light the importance to Keynes of cheap money as a stimulus to investment – he was not just concerned with fiscal policy as the means to recovery, however much he placed emphasis from 1933 onward on the loan-financed expenditure of the Roosevelt Administration in the US. Keynes’s response to a query from du Pré is particularly interesting about Keynes’s distinction between those investment expenditures that are sensitive to interest rates and those that are not. The reports stress a theme discussed more briefly in Keynes’s 1931 Harris Foundation lectures in Chicago (in Wright, ed., 1931) and in Chapter 19 of *The General Theory*, and at greater length by Irving Fisher (1932, 1933) (and later by Hyman Minsky 1975): since debt are contracted in nominal terms, a rise in the purchasing power of money increases the risk of bankruptcy, repudiation and default – and it is not just actual defaults that are costly, but also the perception of increased riskiness. Keynes recognized the exceptional seriousness of the Depression, dissenting firmly from predictions of an early recovery, and he saw clearly how defending overvalued gold parities forced central banks to keep interest rates high, instead of pursuing ultra-cheap money to restore investment. This hitherto-neglected body of evidence allows one to watch the unfolding of the world economic crisis of the early 1930s through Keynes’s eyes, extraordinary events as viewed and narrated by an extraordinary economist. At £12 10s per report (by no means a trivial sum at the time), N. V. Philips certainly got their money’s worth.

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1. “Thursday, October 24, is the first of the days which history – such as it is on the subject – identifies with the panic of 1929” (Galbraith 1961, pp. 103-104), but already on Monday, October 21, Irving Fisher had characterized the fall in stock prices as just the “shaking out of the lunatic fringe” and on Tuesday, Charles Mitchell of the National City Bank declared that “the decline has gone too far” (Galbraith 1961, p. 102). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Philips Incandescent Lamp Works, later Philips Electronics, successor to a firm founded by Lion Philips (originally Presburg), maternal uncle of Karl Marx (Gabriel 2011, pp. 44, 110, 291-93, 295, 299, 315, 334, 366). Although relations between uncle and nephew were “strained by politics” (Gabriel 2011, p. 291), Mary Gabriel (2011, p. 299) refers to Marx’s “fund of last resort, his uncle … He had sold himself to this pragmatic businessman as a successful writer only temporarily short of cash.” Gabriel (2011, p. 642) remarks that “Marx’s dabbling in the stock market has been questioned by some scholars, who believe he may simply have wanted his uncle to believe he was engaged in ‘capital’ transactions, not *Capital*.” After the death of Lion Philips, his sons did not reply to Marx’s letter asking for help with his daughter Laura’s wedding (Gabriel 2011, p. 364). Anthony Sampson (1968, p. 95) reported that the firm’s chairman Frits Philips was “a keen Moral Rearmer and a fervent anti-communist, embarrassed by the fact that his grandfather was a cousin of Karl Marx.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For a sense of what £150 a year might have meant to Keynes: Moggridge (1992, pp. 508, 585) and Skidelsky (2003, pp. 417-18, 519, 565) report that Keynes’s net worth fluctuated from £44,000 at the end of 1927 to £7,815 at the end of 1929, then rising to over £506,222 at the end of 1936, dropping again to £181,244 at the end of 1938. The offer from Philips came at a particularly low point in his finances. According to Skidelsky (2003, p. 265) “investment, directorship and consultancy income” accounted for more than 70% of Keynes’s income between 1923-24 and 1928-29 (including £1,000 a year as chairman of National Mutual Life Assurance), books and articles for another 20%, leaving no more than a tenth of income from such academic sources as teaching, examining, being secretary of the Royal Economic Society and editor of its journal, and being Bursar and a Fellow of King’s College. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. However, writing to Keynes on January 21, H. du Pré was moved “to remark that the latest figures from the Argentine which, according to the handwritten note at the bottom of your letter, you intended to enclose, were not received here, so that we cannot give you an opinion about their importance for us.” [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. When the majority report of the May Committee on National Expenditure projected on July 31, 1931, that the budget deficit for 1931-32 would be £120 million, necessitating £96 million of cuts to unemployment benefits, road construction, and government and armed forces pay, it counted all borrowing by the Unemployment and Road funds as “public expenditure on current account” as well as “the usual provision for the redemption of debt” of £50 million (Winch 1969, pp. 126-30). Keynes accused the majority on the May Committee of not “having given a moment’s thought to the possible repercussions of their programme, either on the volume of unemployment or on the receipts of taxation” – he estimated it would add 250,000 to 400,000 to the unemployed, and reduce tax receipts by £70 million (*New Statesman and Nation*, August 15, 1931; Keynes 1971-89, Vol. IX, pp. 141-45; Winch 1969, p. 130, Skidelsky 2003, p. 446). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. With regard to Britain, Keynes noted that “There is, however, tremendous pressure of public opinion towards the Government Economy, which means in the main a reduction in the salaries of Government employees and of the allowances of the unemployed. It is equally difficult for the present [Labour] Government either to refuse or concede concessions to this trend of opinion. But if a movement in this direction takes place, which is still most doubtful, it remains exceedingly open to argument whether the result on the actual level of unemployment will be favourable.” [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Keynes had given three Harris Foundation Lectures on “An Economic Analysis of Unemployment” at the University of Chicago in June and July 1931, published in Quincy Wright, ed. (1931), and reprinted in Keynes (1971-89), Vol. XIII. These lectures mostly expounded the analysis of Keynes’s *Treatise*, but the third lecture also examined the debt-deflation process, the undermining of the financial structure by an increase in the real value of debts and fall in the nominal value of collateral (Keynes 1971-89, Vol. XIII, pp. 359-61, see Dimand 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. He also raised a “small personal matter”, asking for advice on buying a new wireless set that would “have a thoroughly good loud speaker, both for voice and music reproduction and should be able to pick up distant stations such as Moscow.” [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. A passage crossed-out in the draft of Keynes’s November 1931 letter, in the section discussing the general election, stated that, “As has been the case in the last three or four General Elections, it is that old wretch Lord Rothermere [publisher of the *Daily Mail*] who has been dead right. It is said that he has made a profit on the crisis of £100,000, buying majorities on the Stock Exchange.” Skidelsky (2003, p. 472) relates that Keynes “consistently lost money (his own and his friends’) on the results of general elections.” [↑](#footnote-ref-9)