“POSITIONAL VIEWS” AS THE CORNERSTONE OF SEN’S IDEA OF JUSTICE

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Abstract

Our paper defends that, as soon as we take seriously Sen’s original contribution to the issue of objectivity rather than focus on Sen’s so-called material of justice, the cornerstone of his contribution to the theories of justice may be found in the concept of “positional views”. Sen does not present his theory as an organized thinking around such concept, but we fully assume this reconstruction. Firstly, we highlight the essential distinction of positional views with individual preferences, notably because the former are primarily linked to “objectivity”. Secondly, we argue that Sen’s conception of objectivity seeks to highlight both information and sentiments relative to a position. Thirdly, we demonstrate that such conception of the view expressed by every person allows an evolution towards more transpositional views, whilst remaining her own. We claim that such clarification will lay solid foundations to support and specify Sen’s vague but central idea of public reasoning for the advancement of justice. According to our reading, public reasoning is the means for Sen to widen the information basis available in each position, as well as discriminate between relevant sentiments and irrelevant ones to form a view on justice. As a result, we demonstrate that Sen’s theory of justice, with at its core positional views, is more respectful of persons’ agency than would be, for instance, a capability theory.

Key-words

individual preferences, positional views, objectivity, sentiments, public reasoning, agency, justice

Introduction

The ethical content of public action seems now to be democratic legitimacy (Peter 2007). This is evidenced by the growing literature on normative theories of democracy, whether aggregative or deliberative. In such theories, the only receivable views for collective decision making are those of the persons involved, which means that in no way an external or transcendental view of the good may be imposed to these persons. However the diverse interpretations of the requirements of democratic legitimacy call for an examination of their ethical justification. For instance, we may wonder how it could be objectively shown that one collective decision making is more legitimate than another one. Is the respect of already formed individual preferences more democratic than a public discussion on the relative merits of different agents’ views on what should be collectively done? We may even wonder whether an objective aim can be at all meaningful at the collective level as far as it is supposed to be derived from all agents’ views, usually considered as subjective or too self-centered, hence partial. While the new economic theories of justice work with value judgments that are justified externally, Amartya Sen (2009) proposes an original contribution to normative theories of democracy by raising the issue of objectivity for considering persons’ views. It is for us the object of Sen’s omnipresent notion of public reasoning.

Unfortunately Sen is poorly understood. Most often, commentators disconsider the importance of objectivity insofar as they do not refer to it at all when elaborating on Sen’s theory of justice, focusing generally on his capability approach. Even commentators who underline the importance of such issue merely consider that it is complementary to Sen’s capability
We believe that it is mostly due to a quasi-exclusive interpretation of his work through the prism of capability and the resulting search for an operational theory of capability in his writing. In this regard, we have been able to show that « Sen is not a capability theorist » (Baujard & Gilardone 2015) after he recalled it himself (Baujard, Gilardone & Salles, forthcoming). We nevertheless agree with the consensual observation according to which Sen’s theory needs further clarification and articulation1. We claim that the gap between Sen’s intention and the perception of his contribution may be reduced by a careful attention to his concept of positional objectivity. It is for us his very constructive contribution to the discussion on democratic legitimacy and impartiality in justice theories.

Our paper defends that, as soon as we take seriously Sen’s original contribution to the issue of objectivity rather than focus on Sen’s so-called material of justice, the cornerstone of his contribution to theories of justice may be found in the concept of “positional views”. Sen does not present his theory as an organized thinking around such concept, but we fully assume this reconstruction. This implies thinking justice and collective choices outside the framework of formal welfarism standard in social choice theory and economic theories of justice (Baujard & Gilardone 2015). Instead, we propose to reconsider his theory from the idea that positional views are the basis of any discussion on justice – a basis that is not given, but to build.

Firstly, we highlight the essential distinction of positional views with individual preferences, notably because the former are primarily linked to “objectivity”. Positional views may be objectivized and thus be used as an informational basis to think about justice. Secondly, we argue that Sen’s conception of objectivity seeks to highlight both information and sentiments relative to a position. Thirdly, we demonstrate that such conception of the view expressed by every person allows an evolution towards more transpositional views, whilst remaining her own.

We claim that such clarification will lay solid foundations to support and specify Sen’s vague but central idea of public reasoning for the advancement of justice. According to our reading, public reasoning is the means for Sen to widen the information basis available in each position, as well as discriminate between relevant sentiments and irrelevant ones to form a view on justice. As a result, we demonstrate that Sen’s theory of justice, with at its core positional views, is more respectful of persons’ agency than would be, for instance, a capability theory. More generally, it distinguishes sharply Sen’s theory from any transcendental theories, where agents are not given any leading role. In Sen’s comparative approach, agents are assigned the responsibility of designing and implementing justice.

1. Positional views versus individual preferences

Amartya Sen is promoting since 2009 an idea of justice with the declared ambition of challenging Rawls’s now standard theory of justice. He opposes a social choice approach concerned with less unjust social realizations to a transcendental approach concerned with just institutions. According to a consensual observation well illustrated by a special issue in the Journal of Economic Methodology (2012, 19 (2)), Sen’s theory has the disadvantage of being not always clear, and chiefly less articulated than the one of Rawls. Sen himself acknowledges that connections “may be easy to miss” or “may not be adequately clear” (Sen 2012: 173).

We claim that a way of clarification would be to read Sen’s contribution as a departure from standard social choice theory rather than Rawls’s theory of justice. While it is obvious that Sen’s huge background in this field has truly been influential in his way of tackling the issue of justice2, we shown elsewhere that the framework of formal welfarism standard in social

1 See in particular Davis’, Peter’s, Robeyns’ and even Sen’s articles in the special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (2012) dedicated to Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009).

2 See Sen 2012 for instance.
choice theory is misleading (Baujard & Gilardone 2015). In other words, we should not expect
Sen’s theory of justice to provide a material of justice – i.e. capability – and aggregative
principles that would plausibly be accepted by any individual. We now want to show that
another mistake would be to miss Sen’s departure from the standard preferentialist framework
and continue to understand people’s voices as individual preferences while Sen urges us to see
them as positional views. In this section, we explain why it seems to us justified to elaborate
on the concept of “positional view” in contrast to individual preferences while Sen does not
explicitly assume such perspective (1.1). And we show that it is consistent with Sen’s attempt
to respect person’s agency better than what is proposed in (formal) welfarist approaches (1.2).

1.1. Positional views as the informational basis of Sen’s social choice approach

In our view, what Sen keeps exploring from Arrow’s (1963) seminal program are two general
ideas: 1) that the diverse individual values or views are the essential basis for a democratic
theory and 2) that the comparison of social states is the means to express such views. But, in
Sen’s theory of justice, these two general ideas are translated in a way that is far less
mechanist and easy to grasp than in social choice theory. In particular, it is crucial to
understand that Sen (2009) offers a positional interpretation of individual views that sharply
differs from the concept of individual preferences used in the standard economic literature.
It is all the more crucial to understand this point that the concept of “positional view” is, for us,
Sen’s central contribution on which his theory of justice is based.

It is noteworthy however that Sen does not present his theory as an organized thinking around
such concept, but we fully assume this reconstruction. In The Idea of justice, Sen refers
explicitly to “positional views” only once (Sen 2009: 169). However the reference to
positional “observations”, “perspectives”, “beliefs”, “comprehension”, “illusions”, etc. is
omnipresent: the term “position” is mentioned 147 times and “positional” 51 times in the book
(Sen 2009, computation by Lexico3). We chose to focus and elaborate on the specific concept
of “positional view” because it seemed to us that this expression covers well all the others.
This choice is corroborated by the consideration of Sen’s earlier philosophical work. The
positional interpretation of viewer relativity goes back to the beginning of the eighties. Sen
(1982, 1983, and more extensively 1993) claims that the identification of the viewer’s position
does matter for the evaluation of social states rather than her mere utilities or preferences. In
the welfarist framework, social states are assessed on the basis of given individual preferences
only, with the assumptions that they are reliable and fixed. Sen questions these strong
assumptions, because individual preferences, and more broadly individual views, depend on
the viewer’s position for several reasons.

First, the difference of view between two persons may be explained by their difference of
position in the social state considered. Sen illustrates this fact by the following image: if one
person looks at the moon from Earth and the other from space, they may assess the size of the
moon differently or similarly, relative to the size of the sun, and their observation shall
consequently be considered as position-dependent (Sen 1993: 128). Second, the viewer’s
position may evolve which might change her view on the social state. For instance, if the
second person travels from space to Earth, her evaluation of the relative size of the moon and
the sun will automatically change. Third, Sen underlines the fact that “[t]he person is not free
to choose the position from which he should evaluate the states” (1983: 123). Hence, her view
is dependent upon such position, and there is nothing we can do about this. Consequently, for
a given individual view regarding a specific social state, the position from which it is
expressed cannot be neutral, insofar as the view depends upon that particular position.

Sen insists that his positional interpretation of a person’s views is not fundamentally due to a
lack of “ability to imagine what it would be like to evaluate the state from a different position”
(1982: 37). Indeed, the concept of positional views is precisely thought to facilitate such

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3 We would like to thank Jessica Mange for her help in using this software.
ability, against the standard idea in the economic literature that since “individuals are really individuals, each an autonomous end in himself […] they must be somewhat mysterious and inaccessible to each other” (Arrow 1973: 263). But the fundamental idea is to understand what makes a social state more or less desirable from a person’s point of view because “one of the positions in that state is peculiarly [her] own” (1982: 37). Hence the viewer should be personally involved in the characterization of his own position. In other words, he should participate to the identification of the positional parameters that influence his view in a way that remove the idea of a pure subjective and person-dependant view.

Positional parameters are, for Sen, a question of “any general, particularly non-mental, condition that may both influence observation, and that can systematically apply to different observers and observations” (Sen 2009: 158). In order to characterize a position, it is thus required to highlight the conditions “that (1) may influence observation, and (2) can apply to different persons” (Sen 1993: 127). For instance, “being myopic or color-blind or having normal eyesight; knowing or not knowing a specific language; having or not having knowledge of particular concepts; being able or not able to count” may be such conditions or positional parameters.

Taking positional parameters, beyond individual views, as relevant inputs for collective decision contrasts with the informational restriction of welfarism to subjective utility or individual preference. In Sen’s theory, they are shown to be relevant information for starting public reasoning on justice matters if we want to respect person’s agency.

1.2. A better respect of persons’ agency

The legitimacy of Sen’s positional approach is based on the defense of persons’ agency and relative values (Sen 1982) against a certain tendency of consequentialism, often associated to welfarism in normative economics. This may appear paradoxical since welfarism is generally defended on the grounds that favoring individual utility exclusively and above all else amounts to respecting individuals’ sovereignty. In Arrow’s welfarist framework (1963), such an approach is translated by the condition that each individual is free to have a definite ordering of all conceivable states, in terms of their desirability to him according to a wide range of values. Nevertheless, Arrow concludes that “the doctrine of the voters’ sovereignty is incompatible with that of collective rationality” (1963:60), i.e. with a social decision that would respect each individual ordering. In this sense, he shows one possible way to be respectful of individuals’ sovereignty is to return to standard individualistic assumptions, according to which individuals’ orderings do not reflect individuals’ values regarding social states but his utilities in each social state – i.e. “his own consumption-leisure-saving situations” (Arrow 1963: 61).

Sen applies the opposite reasoning, arguing that within welfarist consequentialism, the person is likely to lose her sovereignty, insofar as an external evaluator restricts any individual view to “a special case of consequence-based evaluation in which the outcome morality is evaluator-neutral” (1982: 30). As a result, there is no room for deontology that Sen defines as wanting “not to maltreat others, in dealing with them (e.g. by violating their rights, breaking his promises, etc.)” (1982: 23). Nor there is room for autonomy, including “the desires, projects, commitments and personal ties of the individual agent” (Sen 1982: 23), except if it

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4 Arrow is clearly in line here with Jevons’ proposition that “every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and no common denominator of feeling is possible” popularized by Robbins (1938). This is the reason why social choice theory has from the beginning excluded the idea of interpersonal comparisons of utility.

5 To be more precise, Sen adds: “It requires not only that each person should judge his control variables (such as acts) ultimately in terms of their effects on the goodness of outcomes, but also that each person must judge the goodness of any given outcome in exactly the same way” (1982: 23).
directly affects his personal well-being. In contrast, Sen states that “[a]gency encompasses all the goals a person has reasons to adopt, which can inter alia include goals other than the advancement of his or her own well-being” (Sen 2009: 287).

Thus, a necessary condition to reestablish persons’ agency is primarily to preclude welfarism, and to let agents choose the kind of evaluation they want to bring into the collective process of decision. Like Peter (2012) has underlined, appeals to external authority has become problematic in economics and, more generally in political theory. We agree with her to say that Sen offers a way around this moral problem without giving up normative reasoning. And we claim that, for Sen, such enterprise involves a radical departure from typical welfarist frameworks. Indeed, Sen (2009: 281, italics are ours) considers that:

[...] the informational inputs in a social choice exercise in the form of individual rankings can also be interpreted in ways other than as utility rankings or happiness orderings. [...] the nature of the debate on the consistency of social choice systems can be – and has been – moved to a broader arena through reinterpreting the variables incorporated in the mathematical model underlying social choice systems [...] and indeed voice is a very different – and in many ways a more versatile – idea than the concept of happiness.

In fact, Sen challenges the standard and narrow approach to “individual voices” in social choice theory, drawing important lessons from famous results (Arrow 1963, Sen 1970). He particularly questions Arrow’s assumption that social choice theory relies on orderings of individuals considered separately, without any interpersonal comparisons or social interactions. For instance, as soon as equity is a concern, the problem is not anymore the consistency of the voting rule, but the fact that “we are in the wrong territory by concentrating only [on] individual preference orderings” (Sen 2011: 10). If we add the concern for minority rights and liberty, Sen interprets the result of “the impossibility of the Paretian liberal” (Sen 1970) as highlighting the crucial dependence of democratic social choices on the formation of tolerant values (Sen 2009: 337). This necessarily involves social interactions with a more comprehensive approach of person’s voices and situations.

Sen’s criticism of the standard welfarist interpretation of the informational inputs of social choice exercises may also be related to his view on behavioral approaches. Sen (1973) argues that behavior is an extremely limited source of information, so that the revealed preference theory is not easy to justify in terms of the methodological requirements of our discipline. To him, the thrust in this theory has undermined “thinking as a method of self-knowledge and talking as a method of knowing about others” (1973: 258). In contrast, the concept of “positional view” opens a path to both introspective and public reasoning.

A view first involves the person who views, and especially the point from which she views. As well discussed by Sen (1993, 2009), “a view from nowhere” is a priori a non-sense. Second, positional views are to be distinguished both from an external version of one’s well-being, and from an exclusive focus on one’s own well-being. Third, whereas in the welfarist framework, preferences are given and cannot be discussed, in Sen’s public reasoning framework, pointing and widening positional parameters may change person’s views. Indeed, with Sen’s conceptual proposal, it is because positional views may be objectivized that they are likely to evolve. In addition to a comprehensive aspect, the focus on “positional views” is able to favor the possibility for reflexivity on one’s own position and some understanding that

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6 See Baujard (2010) for arguments supporting a similar claim.

7 Some of Sen’s first contributions to social choice theory have indeed tried to integrate interpersonal comparisons of well-being in the framework. Then he has provoked an important discussion on the proper way of assessing individual advantage. See Gilardone (2015) on this issue. But his latest work above insists, we will see, on the formation of responsible and other-regarding views on what should be done collectively.
it could be different. We will now see that such objectivization proceeds by highlighting the informational bases available in a specific position, along with the sentiments that tend to prevail in that position.

2. Information, sentiments and objectivity of positional views

Like Zimmermann (2006) remarks, “Sen insists on the embeddedness of individual agency”, in the sense that social environment or economic circumstances influence person’s ends. Zimmermann considers that the capability approach is Sen’s proposal to deal with what she calls “positional agency”. In contrast, we propose to focus on the concept of “positional view” independently of the capability approach, and without restricting it to the issue of the variability in the conversion of resources into functionings. Nevertheless, it is still a counterpart of Sen’s concept of positional objectivity for epistemological matters, opposed to relativism and subjectivism. We need first to make clear that cultural relativism would be a complete misunderstanding of Sen’s notion of positional objectivity. This will lead us to clarify the apparent paradox of a “positional illusion” thought as objective (2.1). We will then show how Sen includes sentiments in the characterization of a positional view, through the concept of “positional closeness” and a relational perspective (2.2).

2.1 Objectivizing positional views and highlighting positional illusions

We already mentioned that Sen (1993, 2009) provides the same illustration of positional objectivity from both his epistemological or ethical perspectives. From your position on Earth, you may perceive the sun and the moon as being the same size. Saying that “I see that they are the same size” is not a subjective fallacy, but an objective view conditional to the position from which the observation is made. Objectivity would therefore be better defined as the “view from a delineated somewhere […] of no one in particular”, as opposed to a “view from nowhere” (Sen 1993: 126/129). Now it should be understood clearly that, in no way for Sen, positional objectivity amounts to cultural relativism.

Firstly, and contrary to what seems to suggest Sen’s illustration of the observation from Earth or space, position is not simply geographical or cultural. For Sen, one positional parameter only cannot characterize sufficiently a person’s view to make it a positional view. Culture is part of the parameters that have to be brought out, but can never fully capture a person’s position. It can even be a misleading positional parameter, since the fact of belonging to a specific society does not entail sharing the prevalent view of that society. Sen’s idea is rather that the identification of a positional parameter sheds light on some reasons behind a person’s view. For instance, when a person expresses her view on the gender inequality in access to engineer positions in the society $S^*$, it may be relevant to know that, in the society $S^*$ in which he lives, there is a common belief in women’s inferiority in mathematics. Such belief explains that women are given little opportunity to establish their ability to perform these jobs, and may influence the person’s view. Nevertheless, Sen (1993) urges us to acknowledge the underspecified character of the position “living in society $S^*$”. Indeed, positional parameters could include knowledge of practices in other societies or criticism coming from “outside” that can sensibly influence a person’s view, though it is not obviously the case of the majority of the members of that $S^*$ society. Ignorance of such practices or criticisms may be, in turn, incorporated as positional parameters. Anyway, only the discovery of every influential parameter would make the view objective and fully understandable by anyone – even by

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8 We need though to acknowledge that, by the time when she wrote the paper, Sen did not fully develop his approach to justice, and the status of his capability approach within it was not as clear as it seems to be now.

9 Taking such positional parameters into account definitely removes any suspicion of cultural relativism. Sen (1993) admits, though, that internal criticism from skeptics or dissenters – through they are often themselves influenced by foreign authors – always carry more weight than “alien critique”.
people living in other societies where there are as many women as men working as an
engineer. It is thus important that positional parameters are many and really influence the
person’s view on the alternative social states.

Secondly, understandable or objective does not mean acceptable. Positional views may be
shown illusory although objectively derived. The objectivity of a view is ensured by checking
“whether such an observation could be reproduced by others if placed in a similar position”
(Sen 1993: 129). Nevertheless, they may prove to be wrong in the face of other views, whose
positional parameters would be broader. Sen interprets the Marxian concept of “objective
illusion” in his own framework: “An objective illusion […] is a positionally objective belief
that is, in fact, mistaken” (1993: 132)\(^{10}\). The source of the illusion is inherent to positionality,
when the precise role of the dependence upon the position is not well understood. Identifying
illusory views would depend greatly on an appropriate specification of positional parameters,
as well as a confrontation with other positional reasonings. Some views could then appear to
be “objective illusions” while others may appear more appropriate when considering a
situation. The problem here is not that the observation is not sincere or ill-thought-out, but
rather the lack of access and scrutiny to other positional views. For instance, the lack of
familiarity with the rules of optics and projections is part of the positional parameters that
make a person viewing the moon and the sun of the same size. Sen (1993) insists that, in order
to discover positional illusions, it is important to relate the person’s understanding of the
world both to acts of observation and reflection. He also recall that “[t]he history of science
gives ample examples of the emergence of agreed scientific beliefs overturning previously
agreed conclusions, or overcoming a plurality of rival conclusions” (1993: 131).

In the one hand, it can be said that all positionally objective views are more or less illusory. In
the other, since a plurality of positional views exists, a view may be efficiently corrected,
nourished or completed. Taking objectively positional dependence is a first step towards better
views.

2.2. taking sentiments seriously: acknowledging “positional closeness”

Sen (2009) acknowledges the importance of sentiments in reasoning about justice, and his
theory of justice may be seen as a return to a tradition largely described by Emma Rothschild
(2001) including particularly Adam Smith and Condorcet (Gilardone 2010). In such tradition,
sentiments are considered as feelings of which one is conscious and on which one reflects.
Sentiments cannot be but the heart of political and moral theories since they are “events that
connected the individual to the larger relationships in which he or she lived” (Rothschild 2001:
9). It is also the case of Sen’s idea of an adequate theory of normative social choice which
invites us to speak another language than the mere language of self-interest, to revive the
grammar of our moral sentiments. Furthermore, Sen criticizes the authors who based their
theories exclusively on reason among whom he seems to put Kant and Diderot, though he
admits that “the need for reasoned scrutiny of psychological attitudes does not disappear even
after the power of emotions is recognized and the positive role of many instinctive reactions
(such as a sense of revulsion about cruelty) is celebrated” (Sen 2009: 50).

Such a perspective leads Sen to include in the characterization of positional views the
influence “positional closeness” and to defend the relevance of a relational ethics for justice
matters (Sen 2009: 161). Positional closeness is related to one’s sense of identity, which is a
crucial medium by which the consideration of others is incorporated into a person’s view.
Although Sen insists that we have plural identities, he also admits that some of them happen

\(^{10}\) Zwarthoed (2013: 104) shows that, more precisely, Sen takes the concept of “positional illusion”
from G. A. Cohen’s work on Marx. She considers that Sen’s use of it is not exactly the same as
Marx’s, since it is not necessarily related to the mode of production and to the position of class within
it. For instance, the illusion of Earth immobility is a case of positional objectivity for Sen, though it
has nothing to do with the capitalist mode of production.
be an important determinant of one’s view (2009: 247). For instance, the prominence to the interest of one’s own children that may come from the parental relationship is part of the positional parameters of one’s view (Sen 2009: 161). The same reasoning applies to other identities like being an American, or a Muslim, or a worker that may dominate in some contexts (Sen 2009: 247). This has to be acknowledged in order to appreciate its social relevance.

Positional closeness needs for instance to be distinguished from the sense of responsibility and obligation that may arise from “the power make a change that he or she can see will reduce injustice in the world” (Sen 2009: 205). Both kinds of sentiments refer to relational ethics and affect a person’s view on what should be done. But the latter has a clear bearing on justice, while the former is more questionable since it is a kind of favoritism. It is possible that, sometimes, the distinction be not clear-cut: a mother feels responsible toward her child, “not because she has given birth to the child […], but because she can do things to influence the child’s life that the child itself cannot do” (Sen 2009: 205). In this case, both reasons need to be taken as inputs of public reasoning.

In other cases, the sense of responsibility cannot be confused with positional closeness, though it is related to a person’s sense of otherness. This is well illustrated by Sen’s discussion of the definition of the relevant “neighbor” based on the analysis of the “Good Samaritan”: different religious people pass by a person who has been severely beaten and do not stop, while the only person who stops and offers help is a Samaritan (Sen 2009: 171-172). The standard Christian analysis of this story focuses upon responsibility, and praises the Samaritan for feeling spontaneously responsible as a human being for another human being. Sen infers from this that the scope of the people you care about is not obviously restricted to your close neighbors – those with whom you share a spontaneous social identity – but may extend to anybody with whom you happen to interact. In the case of the Samaritan, the normative relationship between the beaten guy and the Samaritan emerges from the mere positive fact of their meeting in the same street. Because this event of interaction exists, a sense of responsibility toward the beaten guy becomes part of the Samaritan’s positional view.

According to our reading of Sen, the acknowledgment of positional closeness is a crucial ingredient for characterizing objectively positional views. Now, it is hard to deny that justice is concerned with impartiality rather than favoritism. And Sen’s concept of positional view may be seen as means to favor a move forward from narrow positional closeness, e.g. a person’s view giving no greater importance to her own children although being a parent is part of her most intimate identity (Sen 2009: 161). Impartiality here refers to transpositional views and requires people meet and do not remain within the bounds of a small and isolated community. Public reasoning may help to move in that direction.

3. A framework for facilitating the evolution towards transpositional views

Defining the concept of positional view does not put an end to the issue of the possibility or the likelihood of a collective view regarding justice. But it now appears that the issue at the core of Sen’s theory of justice is: “what are the determinants of the transformation of positional views into a more transpositional view?” – rather than “what is the content of the transpositional view?”, or “is the latter reached or not?” We will show that public reasoning is considered by Sen as the key to reveal positional views and allow their transformation toward more transpositionality.

As Sen often describes it, his theory of justice is closely related to the view of democracy in terms of public reasoning. The expression “public reasoning” itself is cited 115 times. This numerical importance reflects the centrality of public reasoning in Sen’s theory of justice.
Nevertheless, public reasoning is never precisely defined.\textsuperscript{11} We claim that our focus on positional views may help to understand the role devoted to public reasoning and the kind of communication that needs to be implemented in Sen’s theory of justice. What is clearly targeted is “interpersonal comprehension” (Sen 2009: 119), as well as “the assessment of moral and political claims” (Sen 2009: 392).

\textbf{3.1 Public reasoning as a way to widen the informational basis available in every position}

Once we accept the idea that individual views are positional, we acknowledge that some of them can be objective yet illusory or too limited for both offering appropriate considerations on justice and reveal adequately individuals’ values. But we also accept the idea that positions are not immutable and that public reasoning may favor their transformation if the information available from different position is communicated. Not only individuals should change their views but the collective body should be able to realize when it lacks relevant information and needs to find it to be proposed to individuals. At the collective level, public discussion and communication allow both this exchange of information – including with outsiders –, and the expression of the need for further information.

According to our reading, Sen distinguishes three kinds of inappropriate positional views on justice. A first kind is what Sen calls “objective illusions” (Sen 1993: 132) or “positional illusions” (Sen 2009: 166) that Sen attributes to the narrow informational bases available in the considered position. Another kind is “adaptive preferences” that Sen has sometimes used in the context of gender inequality and poverty evaluations, to highlight the social conditioning of individual views (see Gilardone 2009). This second kind is due to the narrowness of perspectives and expectations, given social circumstances, from the considered position. The resultant adjustment of claims and desires represents an obstacle for dealing with persistent inequalities or poverty. A third kind of inappropriate view is parochialism. Parochialism amounts to under-scrutinized local values, fixed beliefs and specific practices. Parochial views are are strictly dependent upon the traditions and culture of the small community one belongs to. As a result, if public reasoning is confined to the perspectives and understandings of the local community only, it might not help to overcome shared prejudices or cultural biases.

All these views are inappropriate to ground a collective view on justice, but also to represent well one’s values and interests. A crucial stake of public reasoning is thus the possibility for individuals to reason on their own positional views. We already justified the focus on “positional views” with the importance of reflexivity on one’s own position and some understanding that it could be different. Communicating one’s view is the means to check whether the proposed claims and the arguments supporting them are publicly defensible and resistant to a trans-positional examination. In other words, the submission of positional views to public reasoning allows both reflexivity and mutual understanding, providing the informational basis available in each position is revealed.

The confrontation with others’ positional views is a means both to move toward more transpositional views and to improve their agency. This last point is rather implicit in Sen’s idea of justice. But since such confrontation may help to remove positional illusion, it can be said that the search for greater transpositionality and the pursuit of greater individual agency are intimately connected. In this sense, a sphere of deliberation is needed for competing lines

\textsuperscript{11} In a footnote Sen (2009: 196) does not consider the definition as essential: “It is possible to define in different ways the reach of ‘an open and free framework of public reasoning’, and the differences in formulation may be quite significant in seeing the precise – and sometimes subtle – distinctions between Rawls’s use of this approach and the uses made by others, including Kant and Habermas. I shall not, however, go further into these issues of differentiation here, since they are not central to the approach of this book.”
of reasoning, diverse experiences, information and knowledge to be exposed and discussed. It is clear for us that Sen’s idea of public reasoning aims at broadening information available from every position, and not from the position of a so-called social evaluator. The access of information to each individual as well as interpersonal comprehension are therefore central issues to be addressed by a theory of justice. Both shall reveal crucial for the identification of inappropriate views, and as a result for favoring their evolution.

While the three kinds of inappropriate views that we had identified – objective illusions, adaptive preferences and parochialism – rely on distinct positional bias, it can be argued that they are sometimes closely related. For instance, “the apparent cogency of parochial values often turns on the lack of knowledge of what has proved feasible in the experiences of other people” (Sen 2009: 407). In other words, parochialism may support positional illusions or adaptive preferences. Public discussion would therefore benefit from including the views of people from other communities in order to identify the positional bias as extensively as possible. Sen (2009: 123-152) introduces the concept of “open impartiality” to insist on the fact that the discussion should not be confined to persons who are entitled to make collective choices or engaged in social evaluation because they belong to the polity for two main reasons. The perspective for those “inside” may firstly be enlightened by distant views on local understandings. Secondly, outsiders might “bear some of the consequences of decisions taken in that particular polity” (Sen 2009: 134) and this information may change insiders’ views on their own decisions.

The “enlightenment relevance” (Sen 2009: 108) of outsiders’ views as well as the possible greater sense of neighborhood, that an open public reasoning may favor, need to be acknowledged by a relevant theory of communication. The aim here is to reduce the felt distance between individuals who may have the most difficulties to understand each other. This is particularly important for Sen’s theory of justice that relies on the consideration of as many positional views as possible and the search for a kind of transpositionality. Furthermore, Sen praises a Universalist ethics that urges us to listen to the most distant people. Communication is therefore particularly critical for the purpose of understanding positional views when the “positional distance” between the individuals is important. Smith (1759 [1790]) already observed that the longer the distance, the more difficult it is to put oneself in other people’s shoes, and to imagine how they are likely to view our sentiments and motives (Gilardone 2010: 717). In this sense, it can be said that a relevant approach to communication should help to clarify from where people talk, i.e. inform on the differential of positional parameters between individuals.

3.2 Public reasoning as a way to assess the relevance of sentiments for justice matters

Once informed of the contingency of their own view, and of the diversity of views in the society, one might wonder: why would people revise their views at all? New information and reasons, in contrast with faith and unreasoned convictions, are certainly important, but they may not be sufficient. An important element of the transformation of positional views is the mechanism by which individuals incorporate others’ perspectives, once they become public. Such a mechanism from the public to the individual level can be found in sentiments. Emotions and sentiments, alongside psychology or instincts, play an important role in inner reflection and, from then on, in decision-making (Sen 2009: 39). Sen considers that sentiments may help each individual to become aware of her connection to others, to feel that what happens to others is, ultimately, of concern for her as well. Just as individuals’ position is not fixed once for all, the narrowness of individuals’ sense of others is not immutable. However, for the purpose of justice, it is important to note Sen’s distinction between sympathetic views and the possible resulting committed views. Only the latter shall prove to be relevant for deriving a collective decision aiming at reducing injustice.

Firstly, Sen strongly suggests that positional closeness is broader than one may think at first sight. What he calls “relational obligations” related with “personal affection as well as agency-
related concerns” (2009: 214) need not operate through the family or the citizenship connections only (2009: 142). Not only do individuals share a common identity because they come from the same family, city or country, but they also share common features such as class, religion, gender, etc. To illustrate, Sen refers to the sense of affinity a feminist activist may have for disadvantaged women across borders (2009: 142). This can lead her to engage in public debate “as a fellow woman, or as a person (male or female) moved by feminist concerns” to express her sentiment of injustice.

Secondly, it is not even necessary to share a common feature apart from being human. Sentiments of horror generated by the observation or the information of famine, genocide, terrorism, slavery or untouchability may have deep consequences on persons’ view and lead them to feel concerned by issues that are not strictly theirs. Sen stresses, quoting Charles Dickens, that “there is nothing so finely perceived and finely felt, as injustice.” (2009: vii) Sentiments of horror or indignation regarding injustice will work as efficient mechanisms for a better incorporation of the positions and views of others into one’s own. If individuals are able to feel outraged by the situation of the disadvantaged, their sentiments shall contribute to the overcoming of divisions of class, gender, rank, location, religion, community, and other established barriers with which injustices are often linked (2009: 389).

Let us now consider under which conditions sentiments play a role in the transformation of positional views. According to Sen (2009: 392), “even pure expressions of discontent and disappointment can make their own contributions to public reasoning if they are followed by investigation (perhaps undertaken by others) of whatever reasonable basis there might be for the indignation”. Instinctive reactions have something to say: “Outrage can be used to motivate […] reasoning” (2009: 389). But, in order to get a socially better view, it is also crucial that instincts do not have the last word.

Surely, sympathy – in the sense of “caring about the miseries and the happiness of others” (Sen 2009: 49) – acts as a powerful tool for incorporating others into one’s judgment. However, Sen also remarks that “sympathy […] is not really essential in being able to see reasons to help a person in pain” (Sen 2009: 372). Obligation, or commitment, appears when one seriously considers “what one can reasonably do to help the realization of another person’s freedom, taking note of its importance and influenceability and of one’s own circumstances and likely effectiveness” (Sen 2009: 372-3). We can indeed mark a distinction between the sentiment of sympathy and the committed view that can derive from it, after thinking and discussion about what can be done to remove the misery of others. A sentiment of responsibility, or at least the condition for its emergence, is in the last case enforced: “if someone has the power to make a change that he or she can see will reduce injustice in the world, then there is a strong social argument for doing just that (without […] invoking the benefits of some imagined cooperation)” (Sen 2009: 205-6).

In other words, stating a disproportionate level of disadvantage, according to some shared values within public debate may first allow people to feel deeply and personally that this might not be right. But this first step needs to be supplemented by a public reasoning on possible solutions. Only reason beyond sentiments is able to check whether a wide judgment has been made, and whether a broad enough range of views, including external ones, has been taken into account. Reading between the lines, public reasoning is necessary to disentangle justified or not sentiments of indignation, then generate sentiments of responsibility and what can be called “committed views”. To this end, we claim that Sen’s comparative theory of justice demands to leave room for the expression of sentiments so that they can be examined in a public and open reasoning. This is surely the best way to favor the transformation of positional views in committed views that would be as transpositional as possible.

Concretely, public reasoning may serve as expressing those sentiments of indignation, which in turn may lead other individuals to face this situation. When disadvantages or injustices are clearly stated, within a public and open framework of thought, it is then very hard to pretend to be individually unaware. Sen’s (2009: 144) insistence on “open impartiality” is linked to the
“liberating role” which the consideration of insights from different positional views from outside the society may have. Taking an interest in outsiders’ views – i.e. a feminist activist from another country –, beyond the constraint of local conventions, may force us to think seriously about what can be done, rather than proceeding as if societies did not owe anything to each other.

Conclusion

Sen’s positional interpretation of individual views developed in the context of his approach to justice has received little attention so far. This is hardly analyzed in the literature except few exceptions (Anderson 2003, Bonvin 2005, Zimmermann 2006, Peter 2012, Gilardone 2015), who acknowledge the centrality of positional objectivity but do not go much further than Sen to isolate and articulate the elements behind this concept. In contrast, we gathered numerous, scattered, and vague textual evidences (Sen 1982, 1983, 1993, 2009), in order to derive an explicit and extensive definition of “positional views”, along with some insights into their dynamics. Our aim was to show how Sen departs from both preferentialism and transcendentalism.

Our reconstruction finds some support in the writings of Fabienne Peter (2012) and John Davis (2012) which put to the forth such implicit points that could make Sen's proposals more understandable, and maybe more accurately debatable. These points, that Sen (2012: 173) recognizes as “constructive contributions”, may be summarized as follows: 1) Sen's approach to justice is implicitly grounded on his “conception of what people are” (Davis 2012: 172), and particularly the focus on people's capacity to reason publically and interact; 2) the necessity of normative reasoning, understood as “public practical reasoning” (Peter 2012: 166); and 3) the centrality of a critical reflection on diverse positional statements to reach a statement that would be transpositionally objective (Ibid.). We have tried to go further in this effort of clarification.

Sizing objectively the exact influence of position on person’s views is what counts for public reasoning. It is a condition for developing a reflexivity of agents on their own views. In other words, it is a condition for favoring persons’ agency in the formation of their views regarding what should be collectively done to remove injustice. In contrast to individual preferences in the Arrovian framework, positional views in Sen’s idea of justice may be seen as a material for public reasoning that needs to be built and discussed in a way that enhances person’s agency.

Such approach relies on what people are, rather than on a fiction of mutually disinterested individuals, or the contrary purely self-centered individuals. Our reading shows that, in the Senian framework, persons are always more or less of prone to objective illusions and to some instinctive sense of otherness. In both cases, public reasoning may help to raise awareness and critical reflection in the direction of more transpositional views thanks to the widening of information available in each position and to the consideration of sentiments that drive people.

References

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